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Innovation Gone Awry: A Case of Public Sector Strategic Change 
 
 





Do big organizations actually learn from their colossal change mistakes and 
attempt to profit from them? This paper presents an original case study depicting a 
massive strategic organizational change effort gone astray. It both describes and analyzes 
the change from the reflective perspective of an insider.  
 
    Offering a non-traditional description of the various phases of the change process, 
this work showcases the “Going-Against-the Grain” nature of effort. It also discusses the 
Zeitgeist or situational context, the relevant history of the affected organization, and 
provides insights into the various parties impacted by the change. Additionally, this piece 
notes the limits of power, rationality and education as strategic change approaches and 
exposes some of the tactical methods employed to implement institutional change. 
 
Brief discussions of risks, problems and barriers as well as a number of lessons 
learned are also provided. Principal conclusions relate to the difficulty of sustaining 
broad scale organizational change over time, obtaining multi-level support and the 
necessity to identify measures for success before the effort begins.  Perhaps the most 
important change skill of all may be to know when to end the effort early to avoid 
significant sunk costs. 
 






     Why is it that some organizations seem to digest and adapt to major changes with 
relative ease and aplomb and others with trepidation and angst? Of late much has been 
written about the planning and execution of large scale planned organizational change in 
a wide variety of institutions and settings. Correspondingly, much less emphasis has been 
placed on the often transitory nature of the changes and, in particular, their often negative 
unanticipated consequences. Decision researcher Gary Klein (2013) suggests a probable 
reason for this temporariness is, “When we’re on automatic pilot, and the connections 
and contradictions are obvious, we don’t give ourselves credit for noticing them.”  
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There does appear to be redeeming educational value in analyzing innovation 
efforts that don’t necessarily meet all their intended outcome objectives.  Glor (2014) 
makes a case for looking at innovations that are not fully applied, are incomplete, or 
don’t necessarily succeed, stating: “There is much to be learned, however, from 
innovations that fail, but they are difficult to research.  A clear distinction must be made 
between innovations that are not fully implemented or that fail and ones that are fully 




     Possibly referring to unintended adverse outcomes, eighteenth century English 
philosopher Edmund Burke, reportedly stated, “Those who don’t know history are 
destined to repeat it.” In the spirit of Burke, the purpose of this paper is to draw practical 
lessons from a major institutional strategic change effort. The intent is to provide the 
reader with an insider view, via case study, of a sweeping change initiative that delivered 
mixed outcomes in a very large organization. The case will explore the original rationale 
for the change, provide the perspective of key participants, note the change strategies 
employed, and describe various tactics used by the change agents. In addition, the case 
study will illustrate reactions to the change processes used, remark on the inadvertent 
consequences, observe the final result, and list some of the lessons learned. 
 
 
Organizational Indigestion as a Process 
 
    Going-against-the-grain exemplifies an organizational transformational change 
effort gone catastrophically awry. Like attempting to eat too much rich food in too short a 
time the change effort induces the equivalent of organizational indigestion. The 
institutional discomfort is sometimes accompanied by a convulsive retching or gag reflex 
as the organization attempts to restore equilibrium by ridding itself of what appears to be 
a foreign invader. 
 
Consulting strategist and author Geoffrey Moore (2005) writing about the 
application of biology to organizational innovation has proposed that: “Innovation and 
inertia are so deeply intertwined that both must be managed concurrently for any progress 
to occur.” In biological terms, the change effort disturbs the organization’s homeostatic 
balance eliciting counter forces that seek a return to stability. The change attempt seems 
to stimulate the organizational counterpart of antibodies in the human immune system. 
Also like the human body, it is hypothesized that an organizational system has the 
equivalent of a cultural built-in “set point” that it attempts to maintain against 
oppositional threats.  
 
The set point is derived from deep-lying values and beliefs that form the basis of 
its ethos and that have been continually reinforced over time.  These values and beliefs 
are often those originally held by the organization’s founders and have been reinforced 
by significant survival-related events in the organization’s history and embedded in its 
culture. These values and beliefs are typically highly resistant to change and are usually 
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collectively and unconsciously held by the organization’s members.  Therefore, the set 




Unleashing a Going-Against-the-Grain Change Effort 
 
A very large department of the federal government was beset by a multitude of 
problems. The proud history off this public sector organization and its traditions were as 
old as the nation of which it was a part.  With the passage of time its bureaucratic 
structure had grown large and cumbersome, its leadership was considered to be overly 
conservative and behind the times, it was criticized as being unresponsive to current 
social conditions, its operating procedures were antiquated, much of its useable 
technology outmoded, necessary equipment was wearing out and was ill-maintained, and 
its funding was being threatened by legislators for a lack of clear demonstrable results. 
Perhaps the most telling signs of discontent were explosive issues with its employees.  
Dramatically reported diversity incidents, growing levels of reported substance abuse, 
claims of mistreatment of younger employees, and departures of experienced and well 
trained individuals were draining its vitality and viability to carry out its purpose.  Each 
week seemed to provide some new press-reported, human crises to deal with, distracting 
leadership from focusing on mission accomplishment. 
 
Pressures mounted to do something fast before the situation became completely 
untenable. To demonstrate his resolve and bias for action, the chief executive officer of 
the overseeing branch decided to replace the department’s CEO.  The new department 
boss was deliberately chosen as someone who represented a radical departure from the 
current viewpoint but was also internally credible.  This individual was much younger 
than the then current staff of senior department officials, had a reputation for getting 
things done, publicly expressed a more positive view of the future, was vocal in his 
opinions, and had the confidence of the branch CEO as a strategic change leader. 
 
Once in office, the new CEO began a whole range of new initiatives designed not 
only to solve the department’s problems but also to get at their root causes.  He 
reorganized the department and replaced key subordinates with those sympathetic to his 
cause.  He sponsored a series of open forums for people throughout the department not 
only for them to voice their issues but to also propose solutions.  Research and 
development efforts were undertaken to identify and put into place a next generation of 
technology.  Relationships with funding sources were improved. 
 
A direct channel was established to communicate messages to the entire 
organization at one time. Sweeping new policies were issued related to racial, ethnic, and 
gender diversity, along with supportive organization-wide training programs, and holding 
managers and supervisors directly accountable for policy implementation and 
enforcement. Nit-picking regulations were dropped to make organizational life more 
acceptable to younger members. Aged equipment was taken out of service and a new 
emphasis placed on proper routine maintenance and upkeep.  New investments in future 
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technologies were begun. A scientific approach to combating substance abuse was 
approved and funded. 
 
The CEO also recognized that his tenure as the appointed head of a governmental 
department was bound to be limited as his superior was a publicly elected official.  
Understanding that long-standing organizations have a great deal of inertia to overcome, 
he adopted an overall breadth and depth cultural change strategy that was to be rapidly 
implemented.  He likened his cumbersome department to a sixteen-wheel tractor-trailer 
truck roaring down a four-lane highway at night with the driver blithely unaware that the 
steering wheel was not connected to the drive train. He wanted to be an aware strategic 
change leader who could positively drive organizational outcomes despite a potentially 
short stay in the top office. 
 
The Chief Executive’s idea on how to make a difference was to target the change 
effort at system leverage points within the department.  These were critical areas, 
promising exponential results, where a significant amount of output would ensue from a 
small amount of input.  Notable examples were: the design of the performance appraisal 
system, control of internal communications channels, investments in research and 
development, and management of the project funding process.  
 
He also recognized that inertia could work in his favor if he could get his 
behemoth of a department moving during his period of leadership. In a sort of 
organizational judo, he attempted use the entrenched resistance as a change lever to serve 
his own purposes.  He believed that once the organization was in motion on its new 
course, and invested with significant resources, it would then be difficult for any 
successor to change its direction and velocity. Like altering the course of a supertanker, 
he reasoned that any additional new alteration in direction would necessitate a 
considerable expenditure of thought, time, effort, and energy. 
 
 
The Gag Reflex Appears 
 
The extensive changes initiated by the CEO had also alienated powerful members 
of senior and middle leadership who had a vested interest in the old ways of doing 
business.  In these members life experience, major organizational change was primarily 
evolutionary and not revolutionary.  Managers had earned their organizational positions 
by slowly climbing the organizational ladder step-by-step and patiently waiting their turn 
to get to the top positions. The CEO’s new developments threatened their traditional 
sources of power, status, perquisites, and authority.  Harvard professor and change 
theorist John Kotter (2002) has noted that: “The ‘boss barrier” is typically handled in one 
of three ways. We ignore the issue, we send the obstacle to a short training course, or 
(rarely) we try to fire, demote or transfer the person.”  
 
The unhappy members found ways to drag their feet on implementing the new 
initiatives, they pled ignorance of the intent, employed subtle misinterpretations, and, in 
some cases, deliberately chose to ignore or disregard them.  The CEO directly confronted 
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a number of his more vocal immediate subordinates. He exercised his positional power to 
clarify his intent and to indicate the consequences of non-compliance.  Some of the more 
recalcitrant subordinates were removed from their positions of authority, some were 
relegated to the equivalent of organizational Siberian gulag and yet others were 
encouraged to retire.  Most opponents, recognizing that their jobs were at stake, chose to 
bide their time, and give outward tacit approval of the new direction. These oppositional 
leaders took their personal views underground sharing their perspective only with trusted 
others.  These individuals chose to employ the classic strategy of the disaffected public 
bureaucrat and wait for the CEO’s successor to come into office. 
 
The CEO also made direct appeals to the rank and file members for support via 
bypassing intermediate organizational levels. In the main, he was successful with this 
approach.  This group of mostly newer and younger organizational members saw him as 
their advocate and champion against an unfair system and their entrenched old-line 
supervisors.  He also went outside the department and solicited the advice of professional 
consultants on dealing with the various external and internal problems. In addition, the 
CEO employed available internal and external media to provide persuasive informational 
statements describing his purpose and intent.  He also created new organization-wide 
educational programs in an attempt to modify the values and beliefs of the department. 
 
 
The Failure of Rationality, Power and Education 
 
Some of the changes backfired.  The substance abuse initiative was recommended 
by a group of social science trained external consultants many of whom were full-time 
research academics. With remarkable naiveté about organizational culture, the 
consultants proposed using objective information alone to change the behavior of existing 
or potential abusers. Videotapes, featuring medical and other experts, describing the 
consequences of using various types of unauthorized substances were produced.  A select 
cadre of internal substance abuse education specialists was trained as program 
facilitators.  Attendance at a video-based informational program was required of every 
organizational member. The program became the cornerstone of a department-wide 
ambitious attempt to reduce or eliminate the perceived substance abuse problem. 
 
The strategic assumption underlying the massive expenditure of resources on the 
informational program was that people were presumed to be essentially rational and 
logical beings. Therefore, if given objective information on the negative physical and 
social effects of illicit drugs, department members would obviously act in their own best 
interests and not use them.  Pre-program departmental measures of the incidence of 
substance abuse had been collected and carefully compared with the post-program 
measurements.   
 
The results indicated that the program had not positively altered the use of 
abusive substances. In fact, as a result of all the information presented in the program, 
drug users found new sources and combinations they had not even previously considered.  
Consequently, based on the statistical results data, the department abandoned its 
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expensive program, disbanded its cadre of internal drug specialists, and returned to the 
more traditional punitive methods of controlling use such as random drug testing, 
employment of drug-sniffing dogs, unannounced inspection of personal lockers, forced 
rehabilitation programs, and harsher penalties for users. 
 
Perhaps the most ambitious of the CEO’s change approaches involved attempting 
to alter the culture of the organization through an educational strategy.  Early in his 
tenure the CEO had solicited volunteers from within the organization to become members 
of a one-year research, assessment, and recommendation group to tackle the increasing 
onerous and public “people” problems of the department.  Over 1,200 members had 
responded to the solicitation and 24 were finally selected for the one-year duration 
research group. Group members were especially chosen to mirror the diversity, degree of 
experience, organizational levels, and principal functions within the department.   
 
After undergoing a brief period of team building and leadership training, the 
group established its own non-seniority based internal structure, defined its mission 
within the broad charter established by the CEO, and set out to work.  Part of the group 
focused on developing clearer information on the human problems and their causes, 
another part of the group began researching potential solutions whether from inside the 
organization or from without, and the remaining part of the group worked toward 
connecting and integrating the problems with realistic solutions.  Within a few months 
the group had created several possible solution options.  Over the balance of the project 
period, the group proceeded to refine and pilot test them for feasibility. 
 
 
Exploring a Risky New Path 
 
Following a year’s worth of intensive work, the project group proposed to the 
CEO a recommended best solution.  The solution suggested creating a process aimed at 
altering the organization’s culture by engaging its members in educationally-oriented 
change it was recognized that this approach would take time but it was believed that by 
involving members in their own data collection, analysis, and action-taking they would 
be much more likely to accept and act on the results. The intent was to incorporate the 
culture changes into the basic fabric of the department. Priority was to be given to first 
involving those units with the most impact on the department’s operational mission. 
 
Internal consulting centers staffed by trained organizational change agents would 
be available to the various units of the department.  Members of the project group would 
develop the change-agent training program and act as the initial core of the consulting 
centers. A structured data-driven process employing a tailored organizational climate 
survey was the principal vehicle of change.  The survey was confidential, taken by all 
unit members, computer analyzed, and the summarized results fed back to those who 
generated them by the internal consultants.  Survey questions addressed the primary 
issues confronting the whole department as well as questions aimed at unit specific 
problems.  After multiple units had taken the survey a massive data-base was created and 
various comparative statistical norms were developed to aid in interpreting the results. 
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The consultants assisted the unit’s members in interpretation and problem 
identification.  A representative cross-organizational level team from the target unit, with 
the assistance of the consultants, over a five-day period, engaged in leadership training, 
problem solving and action planning for the most critical issues emerging from the 
survey’s results.  Six months after the problem solving and action planning effort the 
consultants re-contacted the unit to assess progress and to offer additional assistance. 
Eventually, a semi-autonomous research group was contracted to assess the correlations 
between survey results and the established measures of departmental effectiveness. 
 
 
The Final Result 
 
After several more tumultuous years in office, the CEO retired.  The problems 
that had seemed so intractable at the outset of his tenure had greatly subsided, having 
been replaced as priority considerations by the requirement to plan for large mandated 
funding reductions greatly affecting staffing and mission functions. At the time of the 
CEO’s departure, many of the department’s direct service units had gone through the 
survey-oriented change process several times.   
 
Anecdotal results were generally positive and the research group’s correlation 
studies provided mixed results, some supporting the efficacy of the change efforts and 
others not.  The incoming CEO was only lukewarm in his support for the strategic change 
effort initiated by his predecessor.  Having little personal ownership in the change and 
reacting to pressure from above, the new CEO’s attention moved toward attempting to 
resolve highly visible and pressing fiscal and resource acquisition issues. 
 
After about four more years, the change effort was effectively dismantled by being 
slowly starved of resources and diminished in importance through a lack of senior-level 
attention and support.  The designated internal change agents were reabsorbed back into 
the larger system or took positions elsewhere. The initially well-intentioned strategic 
change became a hidden casualty of the funding cutbacks. Rather than achieving a single 
dramatic ending the program effectively died a death from a thousand small bureaucratic 
cuts meted out over time. 
. 
 
Looking Back Reflectively 
 
In retrospect, while seeming smart at the time, this positively intended large-scale 
organizational change morphed into an ill-executed effort. The strategic endeavor 
attempted to introduce highly disruptive system-wide change. Metaphorically it 
constituted mile-wide and mile-deep alterations in the very fabric of a historically well-
established and highly-regarded institution. As it happened, the change wound up 
challenging the organization’s core values, divided members into competing parties, and 
imperiled time-honored institutional ways of operating.   
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In many respects the overall change effort employed three types of general 
strategies for effecting systems change.   Organizational change theorists Robert Chin 
and Kenneth Benne (1976) first reported this trio of strategies as being associated with 
the use of logic (rational-empirical), culture change (normative-re-educative, and force 
(power-coercive). The entire breadth of the system was affected by the intensity of the 
effort and shaken by the gravity of the attempted changes. Organizational structures, 
systems, roles, and responsibilities were profoundly disturbed.  
 
As the strategic change effort proceeded leaders became distracted from 
managing every-day operational issues and focused their time and energy almost 
exclusively on creating and supporting longer-range change. International management 
theorists and practitioners Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner (2010) 
proposed that:” Innovation happens on the margins of any system where it interacts with 
other systems and, if leaders are not participative, there is no reason to suppose that they 
will hear of those developments or seize the opportunities provided. Attitudes for and 
against the change became crystallized and hardened. Members were polarized by being 
forced to choose between competing visions of the future.  
 
At times, the well-intended organizational change effort seemed to take on 
something of the look of a notorious jury trial.  There were arguments and counter 
arguments, moments of drama and boredom, presentation of facts and assumptions, 
educated advocates for and against, as well as wanted and unwanted media involvement.  
Although the final verdict was still in doubt, the advocates and opponents of the change 
attempted to sway the opinion of a majority of jurors to side with their perspective. 
 
As in many strategic change efforts this one was initiated and motivated by a 
charismatic change leader at the very top of the organization.  The effort was driven top-
down by first painting a clear verbal picture of the organization as perched on a “burning 
platform.” This involved using data to project current trends, measures and effectiveness 
indicators into the future. The forecast showed a highly probable likelihood that the 
organization would experience major pain if no beneficial change occurred. 
 
Like many a newly appointed leader struggling to exercise some control, the case 
CEO responded to the ambiguity and discontent he faced by initially reorganizing.  This 
classic approach has been favored by leaders confronting difficult situations throughout 
history as a means of asserting authority over chaotic organizational situations. For 
example, Roman courtier Gaius Petronius Arbiter in the time of Emperor Nero, reputedly 
stated, “We trained hard-but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into 
teams we reorganized.  I was later to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new 
situation by reorganizing, and what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion 
of progress while actually producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.” 
 
Change theorists and practitioners Richard Beckhard and Wendy Prichard (1992) 
suggest that vision-driven change requires having a good overall picture of the 
organization, gaining managerial commitment to the picture, using the picture to develop 
common goals and understanding the set of key relationships involved. The CEO’s 
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envisioned future scenario also described in some detail the highly negative impact on the 
organization’s ability to carry out its mission should the current situation continue. The 
presentation galvanized the organization. Vocal supporters emerged, as well as detractors 
and skeptics. Significant resistance to the change was mounted both formally and 
informally by powerful and entrenched internal stakeholder groups threatened by 
alterations in the status quo. 
 
The pro and con change groups employed an array of powerful tools and tactics 
available to support their causes. Seminal social psychologist Kurt Lewin (1939) outlined 
a technique called force-field analysis to array the set of environmental forces supporting 
and resisting a planned change effort. Initially forces driving the strategic change effort 
were offset by those opposing it.  Ultimately, over time, the field of driving and resisting 
forces became unbalanced in favor of pro-change forces.  
  
The forces for change were able to marshal in their favor: formal position power, 
control of internal communications media, supportive alterations in the organizational 
reward system, the ability to make policy, the bully pulpit to make appeals to survival, 
and the capacity to paint a powerful new picture of the future as vehicles to make their 
case.  The opposition forces fought a delaying action and used a plausible, and usually 
more conservative, competing vision of the future, enlistment of the outside media, 
appeals to tradition, covert communications, bureaucratic delays, withholding of 
discretionary effort, departures of key assets, and claims of unwarranted unilateral 





 Author and organizational innovator C. Willard Pollard (2002) has suggested a set 
of rules of thumb to follow for successful innovation which includes: early testing and 
piloting, allowing room for mistakes, a supportive organizational structure, and engaged 
leadership.  Based upon a detailed analysis of the case the following constitute some 
important lessons that were learned: 
 
• If your change effort goes against the organizational grain, expect considerable 
internal resistance and longer implementation times. 
 
• Just because a change appears to the right thing to do doesn’t necessarily mean it 
is actually going to happen of its own accord. 
 
• Driving change from the top without the acceptance of the implementers 
generates counter forces from the middle and bottom of the organization. 
 
• Establishing a climate of trust provides powerful support to any culture change 
initiative.   
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• A powerful vision, by itself, is not enough to bring about successful strategic 
change. 
 
• Resistance to change is a natural phenomenon that occurs when organizational 
members are asked to move in directions where the outcome is uncertain and the 
consequences for them are risky. 
 
• Organizational change inertia is real and can be used in both positive and negative 
ways. 
 
• Most of the basic strategies for changing organizations are not mutually 
exclusive; often they can be effectively used in combination. 
 
 
Additionally, a significant major lesson learned echoes that of management authors 
writing about the “Dark Side of Management.”  This is managerial behavior considered 
as negative that produces potentially damaging impact on organizational members, the 
organization itself and the workplace as a whole. Bradley Alge, Erica Anthony, Jackie 
Rees & Karthik Kannan (2010) note, “as organizations attempt to control employees, 
employees become self-aware and ruminate over the perceived threat to their identity- 
one’s self concept.  This threat manifests itself most prominently in a loss of personal 





There certainly are dangers and limits from excessive generalization from a single 
case.  From the author’s significant experience with large scale change in big 
organizations the lessons learned seem both reasonable and applicable to a wide variety 
of institutions. With experience also comes bias so readers are cautioned to consider this 
case study as primarily a warning tale. No one strategic change approach is likely to be 
effective for all organizations across the board. It is probably best to reflect on your own 
specific situation, take what’s useful here and disregard the rest. 
 
The assumption that top management knows the answers to the pursuit of 
successful innovative change is clearly up for challenge. Getting lower-level “buy-in” 
appears to be critical to obtaining a successful outcome.  International innovation 
theorists and practitioners Frons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner (2010) state 
it this way, “The idea that top-management already knows the answers is patently false. If 
you are innovating, you cannot know the answers because no one has done this before 
and the answer as to whether customers want this or not has never yet been posed.  In 
such circumstances it reasonable to infer that leaders know the questions and the 
challenges the organization faces but they do not know the answers as yet, although the 
aim to find out.” 
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According to author Art Kleiner (1996), based on a lifetime’s work in the field of 
organizational change, eminent social psychologist Kurt Lewin asserted that the most 
fundamental change premise is that in order to fully understand an organizational system 
you must first attempt to change it. Far-reaching radical or innovative change is 
molecular in that it usually attempts to alter the basic cellular structure of institutions.  
 
 Change can be viewed as either threatening or freeing depending on your 
perspective.  Mostly it is the perception of current or foreseeable pain, and to a lesser 
extent achievable opportunity, that drive the need for large-scale organizational change. 
Strategic change may also promise a new state of being that does not always include 
maintaining the benefits of the current way. Nor does instituting broad and deep change 
imply a thoughtful analysis of what new problems and issues it might create. Unintended 
consequences are often rampant and hurtful. 
 
Of all the approaches to strategic change, oceanic change or large-scale strategic 
change, is perhaps the most challenging and risky, but also the approach with the highest 
long term potential payoff.  Mile-wide and mile-deep strategic change efforts are very 
difficult for the change leader to sustain over time as external conditions alter and may 
outlive his or her tenure in office.  The very best of these efforts contain provisions for 
their own assessment and continual adaption to ever-changing circumstances.  Noted 
strategic thinker and organizational strategist Gary Hamel (2012) avers: “Today, our 
institutions are up against new challenges: a rapidly accelerating pace of change, hyper-
competition, the commoditization of knowledge, and ever escalating demands for social 
accountability.” 
 
In the movie western The Gambler the card-playing protagonist offers advice 
about what is best to do when confronted by a risky, difficult and uncertain change 
situation while surrounded by hostile forces. Using the game of Poker as a metaphor, the 
gambler advocates the most effective thing is to: “know when to hold’em, know when to 
fold’em, know when to walk away, and know when to run.”  In short, there currently 
appears to be no readily available universal panacea for successfully treating the ills of 
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